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Did Privacy Cause Identity Theft?
by
LoPucKI*

LYNN M.

Introduction
In the Bad Old Days-before privacy became the shibboleth of a
political movement-most Americans had public identities. The
large majority listed their names, addresses and telephone numbers in
telephone and organization directories. Driver and automobile
licensing records were open to the public, as were court records.
Newspapers published lists of local arrests, bankruptcies, and
divorces. If your kid's little league team won the series, the kids'
names, addresses, and pictures were also in the local paper. You
could find out who your neighbors were by consulting a city directory
that listed them by street addresses.' As a legal matter, consumer
credit reports were available to anyone with a "legitimate business
need," 2 and as a practical matter they were available to "virtually
anyone."3 Whatever else one may think of that environment, it was
information-rich.
That richness made impersonation for credit purposes (what we
now call "identity theft") difficult. An imposter's lies were subject to
contradiction from numerous, sometimes unpredictable sources. For
example, today's identity thief often switches the victim's address on
the records of creditors or credit reporting agencies to the thief's own,
thus capturing key portions of the victim's mail. That trick would not
* Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law at the UCLA Law School. I thank Daniel
Solove and participants in the Enforcing Privacy Rights Symposium for comments.
1. Some such directories are still published. E.g., HAINES CRISS+CROSS 2000-2001
DIRECTORY, Los ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. A description of the Haines directories is
available at http://haines.com/ccdirl.htm(last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
2. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, Title VI, § 604, 84 Stat. 1127, 1129
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2000)).
3. WILLARD P. OGBURN, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 34 (4th ed. 1998)
("[Before adoption of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, m]any credit reporting agencies
supplied their reports to virtually anyone."); 114 CONG. REC. 24,903 (1968) (statement of
Sen. Proxmire) ("There have also been many stories telling of the ease with which an
unauthorized person can get a look at an individual's file.").
[1277]
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have worked nearly so well in a world where home addresses were
listed in numerous public places and names were plastered on the
sides of mailboxes.
It is probably no coincidence that the rise of identity theft
coincided with the decline in public identities. That decline began in
the 1970s. Credit-based identity theft emerged as a significant
problem in the 1980s, hitting epidemic proportions only in the 1990s.'
The inverse relationship between privacy and public identitylogically and chronologically-suggests that privacy is a cause, if not
the principle cause, of identity theft.
Like most writers before him, Professor Daniel Solove regards
thieves' access to personal information as the principal cause of
identity theft.' Without access to their victims' personal information,
he reasons, identity thieves could not commit their crimes. His
reasoning is correct, but his conclusion is of less practical use than
might at first seem. Note that the same reasoning would apply to
oxygen. Without oxygen, identity thieves would quickly suffocate,
thus bringing the problem of identity theft to a close. Identity
thieves' need for personal information-like their need for oxygenwill become useful in solving the problem of identity theft only when
practical means are proposed for selectively denying personal
information or oxygen to identity thieves. No such means have been
proposed with respect to either.
To commit their crimes, identity thieves also need privacy. One
person cannot safely pass as another in public. Practical means do
exist for making the process for identifying people public, and so
depriving identity thieves of the privacy they need. Unlike personal
information securing, public identification offers a real-world solution
to the problem of identity theft.
Public identification does not require a return to the Bad Old
Days. One can have a public, thief-proof identity without sacrificing
privacy. That is, one can have it without publicizing one's physical
characteristics or physical location, without inviting an avalanche of
junk mail, telemarketing calls, or spam, without significant increase in
risks from stalking, and without having to trust either the government
or private parties with personal information. In an article recently
4. The phrase "identity theft" appears in only nine stories in the LEXIS Allnws file
from 1980 to 1986. Only the last of those stories is about impersonation for credit
purposes and it refers to the problem as "so new that industry statistics on the size of the
problem are virtually nonexistent." Thomas P. Fitch, To Catch a Thief, U.S. BANKER,
Nov. 1986, at 92.
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1251 (2003) ("Identity theft is a consequence of an
architecture .... It is an architecture ... where personal information is not protected with
adequate security, where identity thieves have easy access to data .... ").
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published in the Texas Law Review,6 I described the legal and
physical infrastructure necessary. I did not name the system I
proposed in that article, but for convenient reference now dub it the
Public Identity System ("PIDS").
In his article published in this issue, Professor Solove disputes
the workability of PIDS.7 While I disagree, I believe that his article
advances substantially the debate over the causes and potential
remedies for identity theft. Perhaps Solove's most important
contribution is his advocacy of what he calls an "architectural"
approach to the problem. While the architectural metaphor is not
perfect, it closely resembles the systems approach that I have been
advocating and using. Solove and I agree that to solve the problem of
identity theft requires analysis and understanding of the concrete
system in which that theft occurs.
We also agree on three specific aspects of the solution. First,
system transparency to the consumer is a crucial element.8 A
consumer should receive notice of activities conducted under the
consumer's identity and have easy access to the records of such
activities. Second, imposters should be put at risk by requiring them
to make personal appearances.9 Third, the government should ban
the use of social security numbers as passwords. 0 That is, no one
should be entitled to assume that I am you, simply because I know
your social security number.
To understand why Solove and I nevertheless disagree as to the
desirability of PIDS, the reader must first understand the relevant
features of the credit reporting system. Part I explains those features.
Part II then describes and evaluates the changes in system operation
Professor Solove recommends. Part III explains PIDS. Part IV
compares the effects of the two competing proposals, concluding that
PIDS would perform in virtually every respect better than Solove's
proposal.

6. Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80

TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001).
7. Solove, supra note 5, at 1264.
8. Solove, supra note 5, at 1268 ("I recommend an architecture that requires entities
gathering personal information about people to keep individuals informed about their
information.").
9. Solove, supra note 5, at 1271 ("[Cjredit card companies should be required to meet
with people in person when first creating the account. This will make identity thieves
more reluctant to engage in fraud, as it will increase their chances of being caught.").
10. Solove, supra note 5, at 1270 ("An SSN, mother's maiden name, and birth date
should be prohibited as the method by which access can be obtained to accounts.").
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I. How the Credit Reporting System Works
Consider the example of Consumer, a person who has never
before had credit. Consumer applies for credit from Lender, a
consumer reporting system participant. In the loan application,
Lender requires several items of personal information. They include
name, social security number, address, telephone number, and
perhaps more. This information will serve three distinct system
functions: as an extended name, as contact information, and as a
password. The information functions as an extended name whenever
participants use it to distinguish Consumer from the approximately
190 million other Americans who are subjects of the system. The
information functions as contact information when Lender uses it to
find or get in touch with Consumer, perhaps regarding nonpayment.
The information functions as a password when system participants
accept Consumer's knowledge of it as proof that Consumer is the
person Consumer claims to be.
A. Why Thousands of People Have Access to Your Personal Information

Upon receiving Consumer's loan application, Lender will seek a
credit report from a credit reporting agency ("CRA"). CRAs are
private firms that collect information on the credit worthiness of
consumers and sell reports based on that information to prospective
lenders, prospective employers and others. Because the CRA
maintains files on some 190 million consumers in the US alone,
Consumer's name may not be sufficient to distinguish Consumer's
file. Others may have the same name, or a confusingly similar name."
To make the distinction, the CRA will require that Lender's request
for a credit report be accompanied by additional information about
the applicant. The most important will be Consumer's social security
number. If accurate, name plus social security number constitute an
"extended name" that is always sufficient to distinguish a person from
all other persons (a "unique identifier").
Credit files are, however, notoriously inaccurate.2 Names may
be misspelled, social security numbers may contain typos, and other
information may be obsolete or corrupted. In part for that reason,
CRAs encourage or require their correspondents to furnish other
information, such as address and telephone number, that might
enable the CRA to overcome errors in names and social security
numbers to nevertheless locate the correct file. As a result, Lender's

11. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 99-100 (explaining the problem of similar names).
12. Research on the types and frequency of errors in credit files is collected in
OGBURN, supra note 3, at 201-04.
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request for a credit report on Consumer will probably contain nearly
all the personal information Consumer surrendered to Lender.
Because the Consumer in this example is assumed to have no
credit record, the CRA will find none, and report that to Lender.
Because it now has information about Consumer, however, the CRA
may use that information to establish a file.
If Lender extends credit, Lender may also report Consumer's
repayment or default to the CRA. Each such report must also
contain Consumer's personal information. The CRA must have that
information to match the incoming report to the correct credit file.'3
The next time Consumer opens an account, the new lender will
require that Consumer furnish the same personal information. The
new lender will forward that information to the CRA so that the
CRA can identify Consumer's file and furnish a credit report based
on it. This process will repeat as Consumer applies for credit from
banks, department stores, landlords, utility companies, and others.
As a result, Consumer furnishes extended name information-name,
social security number, address, phone number, and perhaps
additional information-to every prospective lender, and every
prospective lender forwards it to a CRA.
To complicate matters further, there is not one CRA, but many.
Three CRAs maintain files on nearly every American; and hundreds
(perhaps thousands) of others maintain files on consumers in
particular geographical areas or resell reports compiled by others.
For the current system to operate, dozens of organizations must have
extended name information on Consumer and thousands of
employees in those organizations must have day-to-day access to that
information. Consumer's personal information is everywhere.
B.

An Inherently Faulty System for Password Identification

In addition to serving as an extended name, so-called "personal
information" serves a second, more insidious function-that of a
password. That is, the system operates on the assumption that
anyone who knows Consumer's personal information is Consumer.
To illustrate, consumers are entitled by law to see the file any CRA
maintains on them. To do so, the consumer must, in most states, pay
a fee. The consumer must also prove the consumer's identity to the
satisfaction of the CRA. 4 Online or by telephone, the "proof" is
accomplished entirely by answering questions about one's self. The
CRA compares the applicant's answers to information in the credit
13. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 98-99.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1) (2000) ("A consumer reporting agency shall require, as a
condition of making the disclosures required.., that the consumer furnish proper
identification.").
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file. If the applicant answers a sufficient number of questions
correctly, the CRA concludes that the applicant is the consumer, and
reveals the file.
Of course, information can play no role in the identification
process unless that information is already in the hands of the CRA
before the identification process begins.15 The CRA does not "know"
the consumer. All the CRA can do is match the applicant's answers
to the credit file. No other investigation is conducted. It follows
logically that any of the thousands of people with access to
Consumer's credit file has the information necessary to successfully
impersonate Consumer.
To illustrate, assume that Consumer has good credit. A corrupt
employee of a creditor or a CRA sells a copy of the CRA's credit file

on Consumer to Imposter, a professional identity thief. Imposter is
now in possession of all information that the CRA could possibly use
to distinguish Consumer from Consumer's impersonators. Imposter
can now open accounts in Consumer's name, monitor the CRA's file
on Consumer for changes, and even make changes to the CRA's file
that may prevent Consumer from monitoring it. To the system, an
imposter who knows Consumer's "personal" information looks
exactly like Consumer.
C. An Inherently Faulty System for Documentary Identification
To assist consumers in proving their identities, governments issue
identity documents. The concept is that a government agency will
determine the consumer's identity and then issue to the consumer a
document or card that the consumer can use to prove that identity
when necessary. In the U.S., the most commonly used document is a
driver's license or identification card issued by the Department of
Motor Vehicles ("DMV") of a state government (a "license"). To
prevent an imposter from using a license issued to someone else, the
license may contain a photograph of the person to whom the
government issued it.
The system for documentary identification suffers from the same
flaw as the consumer reporting system. The system has no means for
determining the identity it will certify. As proof of identity, the DMV
will accept a social security card or any of several other documents.17

15. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 98-99.
16. Such illicit sales of credit reports are common. See, e.g., Chris Taylor, Giving
Credit Where Credit is Not Due, The Big Identity Theft Bust Last Year Was Just a Taste of
What's to Come, TIME MAG., Dec. 9, 2002, at 100 (reporting sale of 40,000 passwords for
access to credit reports).
17. A list of documents acceptable in California appears on the Department of Motor
Vehicles website at http://www.dmv.ca.gov/dl/dl-info.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
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A social security card-which contains no photograph-will be issued
on presentation of a birth certificate, or, for a person born outside the
U.S., a document authorizing entry to the U.S. Yet neither document
is in any real sense proof of identity. Anyone can obtain a person's
birth certificate, simply by ordering a copy from the state's Bureau of
Vital Statistics and anyone of approximately the same age can use it,
since it contains no information that can be compared to the user
other than date of birth. Documents of entry to the U.S. are often
based on nothing more than the self-serving statements of the
applicant.
As a result, virtually anyone can obtain a license
identifying them as virtually anyone else they choose.'8
The
California DMV recently estimated that it erroneously issues 100,000
licenses to identity thieves each year.'9
The system for documentary identification could easily be
improved, and efforts to improve it are under way. But a substantial
proportion of Americans are opposed to the establishment of a
national identity card or improvements in state licensing that would
enable that system to function like a national identity card. As a
result, the improvements actually made in licensing probably will be
ineffective ones.
D. How Privacy Causes Identity Theft
In the consumer reporting system, identification is an entirely
mechanical process. When an organization receives personal data, it
compares that data to data already in its possession. If the data
matches, the organization concludes that the person initiating the
transaction is the person he or she purports to be.
Because the process uses sensitive personal information,
identification must occur in secret. Consumer does not know the
route his or her information travels or into whose hands it falls.
Consumer cannot participate in his or her own identification. A
lender who identifies a loan applicant as Consumer will not even
notify Consumer of the identification. As a consequence, victims of
identity theft only learn they are victims an average of fourteen
months after the theft.

18. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 98 (describing layered nature of the identification
process).
19. See Jerilyn Stanley, Identity Theft. Supporting Victims in Recovering From the
Crime of the Information Age, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 566, 570-71 (2001) ("[Tjhe DMV
issues over 100,000 fraudulent driver's licenses to identity thieves each year.").
20. Janine Benner et al., Nowhere to Turn: Victims Speak Out on Identity Theft, A
CALPIRG/Privacy
Rights
Clearinghouse
Report
(CALPIRG/Privacy
Rights
Clearinghouse, Sacramento/San Diego, Ca.), May 2000, at 3, available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft2000.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
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Consumer has the right to examine the file any CRA keeps on
Consumer." But as the system currently operates, Consumer has no
means of knowing which CRA's file may contain evidence of an
ongoing identity theft. Privacy pundits glibly recommend that
Consumer monitor them all.2" To obtain a single copy of his or her
file at each of the three major CRA's, Consumer must pay about $25
and prove his or her identity to the satisfaction of the CRAs. Recall
that to prove his or her identity, Consumer must provide personal
information to the CRAs by answering questions. If Consumer's
answers match the information in the credit file, the CRA will accept
Consumer's identity and sell Consumer a copy of the file.
Also recall, however, that much of the information in CRA files
is incorrect. Correct information furnished by Consumer may not
match the information in the file. In that event, the CRA will deny
Consumer access to the file. For example, I was unable to access my
credit file because a creditor furnished the CRA with an incorrect
address for me.23 My actual address did not match the address in my
credit file. In my Information Law class each semester, I illustrate the
difficulty of accessing one's own credit file by requiring that each
student try to do it. I query them in class on the results. On average,
about 10% are denied access to their files.
Identity theft flourishes because identification occurs in secretin a faulty process that victims are unable to monitor effectively. The
system cannot simply dispense with the secrecy. The secrecy exists to
protect Consumers' privacy rights in the information used to identify
As previously noted, privacy objections also prevent
them.
improvements in the system for identification. Thus privacy claims
are at the root of the chain of causation that leads to identity theft.
II. Professor Solove's Changes
Professor Solove proposes to remedy none of the three problems
described in Part I. After implementation of his reforms, thousands
of employees would continue to have access to Consumer's personal
information. Creditors and CRAs would continue to identify credit
applicants mechanically by the applicant's knowledge of personal
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2000).
22. For example, under the heading "What you can do today [to prevent identity
theft,]" the Federal Trade Commission website advises: "[o]rder a copy of your credit
report from each of the three major credit reporting agencies every year." Federal Trade
Commission, ID Theft:

When Bad Things Happen To Your Good Name, available at

http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheft.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2002). E.g.,
Taylor, supra, note 16, at 100. ("[TJhe most effective way to keep your identity clean is to
check your credit reports once or twice a year.).
23. Lynn M. LoPucki, No Credit Where Credit Was Due, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1997, at
A2 (recounting the denial of access).
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A. Personal Appearances
First, Solove would require that a consumer personally appear in
the office of the lender to open a new account: "[C]redit card
companies should be required to meet with people in person when
first creating the account. This will make identity thieves more
reluctant to engage in fraud, as it will increase their chances of being
caught."24
While such arrests would certainly be possible, they would not be
common. Few lender's would know an imposter by appearance. To
determine whether a personally-appearing applicant was an imposter,
lenders could only continue to use the means they currently use fzr
obtaining personal information from the
determining identity:
applicant and seeing if it matches a credit report.
As Solove recognizes, personal appearances would be an
expensive change in the functioning of the consumer credit system. 5
Each consumer opens numerous credit accounts. Today, they do so
without making personal appearances.
If the law were changed to require appearances, many kinds of
lenders would have to reorganize their businesses to make such
appearances feasible. For example, a New York bank that wanted to
continue to solicit credit card customers nationwide would have to
arrange for local agents in every city before whom credit card
A consumer who wished to rent an
applicants could appear.
apartment in a distant city might have to travel to that city to make
the required appearance. Most importantly, every consumer who
opened an account would at least have to travel locally to make the
Consumers would no longer have the
required appearance.
convenience of opening accounts by mail, by telephone, or on the
internet.
B. Mandatory CRA Reports and Notices
As an alternative to his proposal for mandatory personal

appearances, Solove would require that every creditor opening a new
account purchase a CRA report containing the applicant's name,
address, and telephone number. 6 Probably most creditors already
24. Solove, supra note 5, at 1271.
25. Solove, supra note 5, at 1271 ("The downside to this solution is its high cost.").
26. Solove, supra note 5, at 1271 (proposing to "require companies that want to open a
new account through the mail to verify a person's address, date of birth, and phone
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obtain credit reports, which include this information. But many,
including most landlords, most utility companies, some stores, and
probably even some credit card lenders, do not obtain credit reports.
They would have to purchase a CRA's contact information, thus
adding to total credit reporting system costs. The CRAs would no
doubt be pleased with the increase in business.
Solove would required creditors to purchase this information to
facilitate a second requirement he would impose: that each creditor
opening a new account notify the consumer in three ways. First, the
creditor would mail notice to the consumer at the address on the loan
application. Second, the creditor would mail notice to the consumer
at the address listed in the CRA's file. Third, the creditor would
phone the consumer at the telephone number in the CRA's file."
Solove does not indicate whether the creditor should lend before
these notices are given and the consumer has had an opportunity to
reply.
Either way, these notices would make identity theft more
difficult by alerting some victims at an earlier date. Those victims
could then take steps to protect themselves.
The notices would, however, be expensive and inconvenient.
Because the vast majority of account openings are by consumers
rather than imposters, the vast majority of notices would convey
information of which the consumer was already aware.
Identity thieves have already developed methods of working
around such notices. For example, before opening the new account,
the thief-impersonating the consumer-could report a change of
address and telephone number to the CRA. When the thief then
opened the new account, the required notices would go to the thief
rather than the consumer. Even if the address in the CRA's file is
that of the consumer, an enterprising thief could still beat the system.
The thief would steal the address-change notice from the
unsuspecting consumer's mailbox. To facilitate that theft, imposters
might target victims whose mailboxes are insecure and for whom the
CRAs do not have telephone numbers. 8

number with a credit reporting agency .).
These reports are commonly referred to as
"credit headers."
27. Solove, supra note 5, at 1271 (referring to "written confirmation both to the
address that the applicant lists on her application as well as to the address that the credit
reporting agency has. Further, the company should follow-up by calling the applicant's
telephone number listed with the credit reporting agency.").

28. Greg Botonis, Deputies Round Up Five Suspects in Mail, Identity-Theft Ring, L.A.
DAILY NEws, Nov. 28, 2002, at AV1 ("Identity thieves, investigators said, target

neighborhood delivery and collection mail boxes and curbside home boxes, especially
those that are difficult to see from the residence.").
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Free, Easy Access to Credit Files

Professor Solove recognizes that under the current system,
consumers' access to their CRA files is expensive and difficult. He
would solve the problem by making access free and easy. A few
states already mandate free access.

9

Aside from the expense-which

presumably will be passed along to creditors in the form of higher
prices for credit reports and then passed along by creditors to
consumers in the form of higher loan closing costs-free access
should create little difficulty.
Easy access is a different matter. Credit files from the big three
CRAs are already available on the internet. The difficulty in
obtaining them is almost entirely the difficulty of proving one's
identity to the satisfaction of the CRA. The proof requirement exists
to protect the privacy of the consumer's credit file. This puts Solove
in a bind. Any easing of the proof requirement would reduce the
consumer's privacy protections-a consequence that Solove clearly
does not intend.
As it currently operates, the credit reporting system has no
means for distinguishing Consumer from an imposter who knows the
information in Consumer's credit file. Thus, any change that would
make it cheaper and easier for consumers to examine their credit files
would also make it cheaper and easier for imposters to examine
consumers' credit files.

Solove responds to these observations by proposing an "opt-in

regime to credit reporting."30 A CRA would be entitled to sell a
report only on a consumer who chose to become the CRA's
customer. While the idea is intriguing, Solove gives no clue as to how
he would implement this massive change or what the effect would be
on the cost and availability of credit reports. Nor does he offer any
explanation of the mechanism by which the opt-in regime would
"curtail problems of improper access."31

IlI. The Public Identity System ("PIDS")
In an earlier article, I described a system that would completely
eradicate the most common and most troublesome form of identity
theft: new account openings.32 In his article, Professor Solove
considers and rejects the system.3 In this part, I briefly describe the
essentials of the system and respond to Solove's objections.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

OGBURN, supra note 3, at 83-84 n.117 (listing provisions of state law).
Solove, supra note 5, at 1269.
Solove, supra note 5, at 1269.
See LoPucki, supra note 6.
Solove, supra note 5, at 1263-66.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

PIDS would enable any consumer to publicly claim his or her
identity and publicly provide instructions for his or her identification.
Creditors who opened new accounts for imposters without using the
system and following the consumer's instructions would lose the
exemption creditors currently enjoy from lawsuits based on
defamation, negligence or invasion of privacy.

Instead of identifying persons from scratch each time they
appear, PIDS would make a "primary identification," establish a
contact link to that person, and thus enable anyone to make a
"secondary identification" through the link.
A.

Primary Identification

Any consumer who chose to participate in the system could
make application to the administering agency.
To facilitate
concreteness in this discussion, assume that the agency delegated its
duties to local DMVs. Upon receipt of the application, the DMV
would do two things. First, it would post the applicant's name, social
security number, and proposed instructions for identification on a
public, read-only website. The posting would recite that a primary
identification was in progress. Second, the DMV would investigate to
determine if the applicant is the person to whom the social security
number was issued. In most instances, the investigation would be
cursory. The DMV would compare the applicant's information with
the information in the files of a single CRA and the earnings
information shown on the relevant social security account.35 In
suspicious cases, the investigation would be more extensive.
The investigation contemplated would be inexpensive. Similar
investigations are done by firms that issue SSL Web Server
Certificates. Those firms identity and verify the physical location of
the person or entity to whom the firm issues a certificate. In the
course of that investigation, they may require documentary evidence
or check public records. I paid $65 for a SSL Web Server Certificate
issued by Thawte, Inc. for lopucki.com, which included the cost of the
identification. 6 Like the Web Server Certificate System, PIDS could
be supported by user fees.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e)(2002); OGBURN, supra note 3, at 274-81.
35. One expert on identity theft estimates that most impersonations could be
eliminated by creditors spending "two minutes" comparing each credit application they
receive to information contained in a credit report. Telephone interview with Beth
Givens, Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (Nov. 27, 2002). Comparison by the
DMV under PIDS would be equally effective, but more efficient because the comparison
would be required only once per participant, not once per credit application.
36. See Thawte, Web Server Certificates, available at http://www.thawte.com/html/
RETAIL/ssl/index.html (explaining what a web server certificate is) (last visited Dec. 3,
2002).
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The DMV would have thirty days in which to complete its
investigation.

At the end of that period, the applicant would be

required to make a personal appearance at the offices of the DMV to
complete the application process-without yet knowing the results of
the investigation.
Imposters could not complete the application process, because
the likelihood of arrest would be too high. Even if the DMV
investigations were generally ineffective, the public posting of the
application would be sufficient to deter. Anyone could be monitoring
the website searching for fraudulent applications. They might include
non-participants guarding their own identities, services hired by them,
or merely curious friends, relatives, or strangers. Any of those people
could have notified the DMV of the fraudulent nature of the
application. Prodded by the victim, even a generally dull, nonresponsive agency could stumble through to make the arrest. DMV
performance would be enhanced by the public nature of its failures:
any successful impersonation would have appeared publicly, on the
DMV's watch, for a period of thirty days. If the victim complained to
the DMV during that period, the DMV's malfeasance would be
inescapable.
The primary identification process would provide a crucial
element missing from the current system. Through the DMV's
investigators, the process could determine identity on the basis of
personal relations, personal appearances, and multiple sources rather
than on the basis of a mechanical matching of characteristic values.37
Because the current system cannot distinguish the consumer from an
imposter who knows the consumer's personal information, actors in
the current system-including law enforcement agencies-always
remain unsure whether they are dealing with a victim or an imposter.
Identity theft victims may be jailed. Notices intended for victims may
go to imposters instead. Imposters may place alerts on credit files,
thereby preventing victims from accessing them. In this uncertain
environment, public or private enforcers find it difficult to take
decisive action against a suspected imposter. They realize they don't
really know for sure who is who. The primary identification process
would eliminate that uncertainty by assuring that the person listed on
the website was not an imposter.
Even if an imposter did get through the primary identification
system, in most cases no serious damage to the consumer would
result. Imposter's use of Consumer's identity for credit purposes
inflicts no loss on Consumer until false reporting occurs. The
37. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 115-17 (describing the investigation); id. at 120-21
(describing the investigation's ability to reach into the applicant's community); id. at 12527 (describing the theory behind the primary identification requirement).
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principal damages are the costs Consumer incurs in time and money
setting the record straight. Those damages are great in the current
system because the inaccurate credit record is spread throughout the
files of numerous CRAs, creditors, government agencies, and others.
The victim must correct them one by one. Even during the correction
process, the identity thief may continue to impersonate the victim.
Also, because the corrected records are no more authoritative than
the uncorrected ones, creditors and CRAs often inadvertently reverse
corrections already made.
PIDS provides a single, authoritative focal point for
identification. Once the website is corrected, the victim need make
no further proof of identity-mere notice to creditors and CRAs will
be sufficient to enable them to correct their records. Under PIDS,
cleaning up a credit record would take a few days, not years.
The DMV might make stupid errors and bullheadedly refuse to
correct them, just as creditors and CRAs do in the current system.
The difference is that under PIDS, the victim would have a right to a
hearing, and ultimately judicial appeal. It is difficult to imagine a case
in which an imposter would contest a victim's identity claim in a
hearing8
B. Secondary Identification

At minimum, the public website would contain the consumer's
name, social security number, and instructions for identification.
Consumer would be entitled to choose among several alternative
instructions." They might require that prospective lenders merely
send notice of an account opening to the consumer. Alternatively,
the instruction might require that prospective lenders wait for the
consumer's reply before opening the account. The contact might be
by mail, by telephone, by email, or by encrypted email if the creditor
uses that technology. If the consumer's contact information has
changed in the preceding ninety days, the instructions may require
the creditor to comply with both the old and new instructions.
Creditors who chose to use the system would access the website
before opening any new account. They would obtain the consumer's
instructions and comply with them. For example, assume that a
consumer posted an instruction to contact her by cell phone, and later
went to a bank to apply for a credit card. The loan officer at the bank
would confirm her identity by consulting the website, obtaining the
cell phone number, and calling it. She could take the phone out of
her purse, answer it, and confirm her own identity. A participant who
38. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 128-29 (describing the method for handling
challenges to a claim of identity in the primary identification system).
39. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 118 (listing the permissible instructions).
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did not want to publicly list his cell phone number might instead
obtain an email address for use only in PIDS. If the participant
applied for a credit card online, the lender would consult the website,
obtain the email address, and send notice of the credit application to
it. The participant would confirm his identity by answering the email.
C.

Why the Public Information Is Harmless
To obtain the full benefit of PIDS, consumers would have to
publicly display at least three items of information: name, social
security number, and contact information. Social security number is
necessary to enable a participating creditor to identify its credit
applicant as the person listed on the website. The consumer's name is
needed to provide redundancy in matching and thereby overcome the
inevitable errors in transcription of social security numbers. Contact
information is necessary for the recipient of a credit application to
give the system participant notice that a transaction on the
participant's identity is in progress.
(1) Social Security Numbers

Public display of their social security numbers is unlikely to harm
participants. Before the system is implemented, federal law would be
changed to prohibit the use of social security numbers as passwords.
No one should be entitled to assume that a loan applicant is a
particular person simply because the loan applicant knows the
person's social security number. Social security numbers will no
longer be a key that unlocks a consumer's financial information,
educational record, or other personal information. Such a law should
be enacted whether or not PIDS is implemented and is already long
overdue. Professor Solove agrees."
Professor Solove objects to the public disclosure of social
security numbers because disclosure "will increase the use of the
number to link up records about people."'" The increase would not,
however, be significant for people who chose to list minimal
information on the website. To understand why, consider the two
possible types of people: people like myself whose names are unique,
and people like John Smith whose names are not unique. (For
convenience, I will refer to the latter as people with "common
names.")
Social security numbers cannot increase matching for people
with unique names for the simple reason that any information
accompanied by a name can be matched without the social security
40. Solove, supra note 5, at 1270 ("An SSN, mother's maiden name, and birth date
should be prohibited as the method by which access can be obtained to accounts.").
41. Solove, supra note 5, at 1265.
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number. The social security number could only increase matching in
situations where information is available by social security number,
unaccompanied by name. I can think of no situation worthy of
concern in which that occurs."
Nor could the public display of social security numbers
significantly increase unwanted linking for persons with common
names. Human identification theory tells us that for information to
be used in linking, that information must be present on both sides of
the match. 3 The website would, at minimum, contain only three
items of information: name, social security number, and contact
information. Without other information, a common name is useless
in linking-the link would be to relevant and irrelevant information.
The contact information displayed could be an email address used for
no other purpose. Such an address could never appear on the other
side of the match, also rendering it useless in profiling.
The social security number could be used only to match to other
records that also contained the participant's social security number.
Such a match might seem sinister, but is not. To make the match, the
user would already need to have the participant's social security
number, and would almost certainly already have the participant's
name. Thus, success of the match could add only a single new item of
information to the user's "digital dossier" on the consumer:" an
email address that could not be used for marketing purposes 41
Some participants will choose to list more than the minimum
required information on the PIDS website. When they do so, they
may be contributing to the "digital dossiers" kept by unknown
persons and organizations. I am one of many people who consider
the dangers of such "dossiers" vastly overblown and easily
outweighed by the benefits of a public identity. That some do not
want information-rich public identities is not in itself a reason to deny
them to others.

42. If a name were rendered illegible on a record that contained a social security
number, information from the website might be used to restore the name. But I know of
no reason why anyone would deliberately render a name but not a social security number
illegible, so the restoration of the name will almost certainly be a convenience, not a
threat.
43. LoPucki, supra note 6, at 98-99.
44. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) (complaining that private sector entities are
compiling "digital dossiers" on individuals and sharing them with government).
45. The prohibition on use of PIDS information for marketing purposes is discussed in
the next subsection.
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(2) Use of Website Informationfor Marketing Purposes

Federal law should also prohibit use of the information displayed
on the website for marketing purposes. Such laws have already been
upheld against First Amendment challenge in other contexts.46

Both the government and participants would have a role to play
in "seeding" the website so that violations of the prohibition could be
discovered and prosecuted. The government's role would be to list
non-existent persons on the website, with contact points that the
government would monitor. Because the person was non-existent,
marketing materials could be addressed to the person only by abuse
of information on the website. The government would respond to
such materials with prosecutions. The participants' roles would be to
create variants of their contact information that would appear
nowhere except on the website and to report marketing materials sent
to those variants to the government enforcement agency for
prosecution.
Professor Solove correctly observes that few people have any
expertise in seeding.47 Fortunately, none is necessary to obtain the
benefits of seeding. A few people, who do have expertise, will
intentionally seed their own information. Others will unintentionally
seed theirs by making errors in the entry of data. The appearance of
either kind of seed information in mailings to system participants
would prove the mailer's misuse of PIDS information. Because the
mailer has no way of distinguishing seeded entries from unseeded
ones, the seedings of the few would protect all system participants.
(3) Stalking

The information listed on the website will enable anyone to
contact the participant. Most people consider the resulting threat to
privacy minor. They list their telephone numbers in publiclydistributed telephone directories.
For some, like stalking victims, the threat is more serious. But
even a stalking victim could comfortably participate in PIDS. The
challenge she would face would be to provide contact information
that would work quickly and easily without divulging her physical
location.
Celebrities have long dealt with this problem by publicly listing
only their agents' contact information. The agent passes the message
46. E.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Int'l Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1001 (1992) (upholding a statute providing that lists of
political contributors filed with the Federal Election Commission may not be sold or used
by anyone else to solicit contributions or for a commercial purpose).
47. Solove, supra note 5, at 1266 ("However, it is unclear whether many individuals
have the sophistication to concoct creative attempts to seed their information.").
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along to the celebrity and then passes the celebrity's answer-if anyalong to the inquirer. For people of ordinary means, a telephone
answering service or a friend can perform essentially the same
function.
Most stalking victims could protect themselves adequately by
displaying an email address as their sole point of contact on the
website. If the email address is through a national provider, such as
Hotmail or AOL, the address would provide no clue to the recipient's
physical location. A sophisticated stalker might send the victim an
email containing a web-bug that would send a return message when
the user opened the email, but software is available to discover and
disarm such programs.48 By posing as a creditor seeking to confirm
identity, the stalker might induce the victim to send him a message.
But the victim's response will not reveal her physical location if she
uses the services of an anonymous remailer. Even if the stalker
succeeded in tracing a response from the victim's computer, the
stalker could at best learn the location of the first internet router to
handle the message-not the physical location of the victim's
computer.
Professor Solve objects that the difficulty of using these
techniques may "disadvantage those who are not computer savvy" by
excluding them from the voluntary PIDS system." I take this as a
compliment to PIDS, because it recognizes participation in PIDS as a
valuable benefit. The fact that not everyone can benefit equally or as
easily from the system is not sufficient reason to deny the benefit to
everyone.
D. Professor Solove's Other Objections

Professor Solove raises three other objections to PIDS, none of
them valid. First, he complains that PIDS "relies too heavily upon
the initiative of individuals" in requiring that consumers make
application to participate, make a personal appearance, and engage in
monitoring of the website. 1 A system that could eradicate identity
theft without requiring consumer initiative would, of course, be
better. None, however, has been proposed. The alternatives that
have been proposed-including Solove's own-would require greater
consumer initiative than PIDS to merely ameliorate identity theft.
For example, Solove's proposed solutions would require that
48. E-mail from Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law, to cyberprof__list (Nov. 23, 2002) (on file with author).
49. E-mail from Declan McCullagh to cyberprof..list (Nov. 27, 2002) ("Any competent

remailer will strip out identifying headers.") (on file with author).
50. Solove, supra note 5, at 1264.
51. Solove, supra note 5, at 1264.
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consumers take the initiative to guard their personal information,
monitor their credit files at several, often hostile, credit reporting
agencies, establish customer relationships with CRAs, and make
personal appearances to open accounts. Even more initiative is
required of consumers under the current system. Not only must they
guard their personal information and monitor their credit files before
they become victims; after the crime they must initiate CRA "alerts"
and reinvestigations, file complaints with the police, and prove their
innocence to every creditor or CRA who would misreport
information about them. For PIDS participants, all that need for
initiative would disappear.
Second, Solove believes that so few people will use PIDS that "it
would function as little more than a band-aid solution. Identity
thieves could concentrate their efforts on the vast majority of people
who do not participate in the system."52 Essentially, Solove is saying
that people are not sufficiently concerned about identity theft to use a
cheap, easy system that would prevent it. I believe the people who
are the most vulnerable to identity theft would participate in PIDS.
Thieves would migrate to the next most vulnerable group of
nonparticipants, who would then become participants. The process
would continue until the next most vulnerable group of nonparticipants was insufficiently vulnerable to support the crime. Only
a minority of Americans would be members at that point, because
only a minority of Americans-those with good credit-are
significantly vulnerable to identity theft.

Neither of us has proof for our beliefs. The only practical way to
generate that proof would be to implement PIDS. The system is not
incompatible with other proposed solutions, it can be supported
almost entirely by user fees, and it can operate at almost any scale.
There would be no harm in trying.
Third, Solove complains that "[t]here is no guarantee that
LoPucki's government agency will have better data security practices
than other government agencies" whose websites "have been hacked
numerous times."53 Solove does not even suggest what he fears from
this lack of security. No data can be taken, because all data on the
website is already public. Data on the website cannot be changed
because the website is read-only. It is constantly refreshed from an
off-line database. If data on the website were somehow changed, the
change would occur publicly, would be noticed, and so would be
remedied. That compares favorably with Solove's reliance on private
CRAs, where intrusions occur in secret and consumers do not even
have the right to know of them.
52. Solove, supra note 5, at 1264-65.
53. Solove, supra note 5, at 1265.
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Comparison and Conclusions
PIDS is superior in virtually every respect to both the current
system and to the systems Solove proposes. In the latter systems,
each consumer must monitor his or her identity at several, passwordprotected CRAs. In PIDS, each consumer could monitor his or her
identity on a single web page, with a single click. Under one of
Solove's proposals, every consumer would have to make a personal
appearance to open each new account and the consumer would make
those appearances in circumstances unlikely to deter imposters.
Under PIDS, only system participants would have to make personal
appearances, each ordinarily would have to appear only once, and the
appearance would be in circumstances highly likely to deter
imposters.
Solove and I both recognize the need to give notice to consumers
of transactions involving their identities. Solove's notices would go to
all consumers, whether they wanted them or not, by mail and
telephone, reaching them only after the transaction. PIDS notices
would go only to consumers who wanted them, would go by the
medium the particular consumer preferred, and would reach the
consumer in time to prevent identity theft.
Under Solove's proposals, knowledge of personal information
would continue to serve as proof of identity, forcing consumers to
continue their futile attempt to secure their personal information to
prevent identity theft.
Under PIDS, knowledge of personal
information would no longer serve as proof of identity; identification
would be determined by public claim and personal contact.
Consumers would no longer need to guard their personal information
to prevent identity theft. Even a thief with all of Consumer's

personal information could not impersonate Consumer.
PIDS would generate fewer personal appearances, fewer notices,
and fewer transactions with CRAs, giving it a cost advantage over
the systems Solove proposes. PIDS would have two expenses that
Solove's system would not: investigating identities and maintaining
the web site. However, those costs would be incurred and paid only
by voluntary participants.
Solove's system incurs no cost of
investigating identity only because it has no mechanism for
investigating identity.
In summary, today's credit reporting system has two fatal flaws.
First, the system identifies people only mechanically and therefore
lacks the ability to distinguish a consumer from an imposter who
knows the contents of the consumer's credit file. Second, integration
of the identification subsystem with credit files that contain sensitive
personal information forces the identification subsystem into secrecy.
Even if the system were to adopt an ideal of full transparency, the
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need to protect that sensitive personal information would hobble the
mechanisms of access and so prevent realization of the ideal. Solove
proposes to remedy neither flaw.
PIDS separates the personal identification function from the
credit reporting system. Persons can publicly claim their identities
and thus prevent theft, without disclosing, or risking the disclosure, of
sensitive personal information. The system is fully scalable, 4 could be
voluntary for both consumers and lenders, and could be supported
entirely by reasonable user fees. The system was developed with
new-account identity theft in mind, but could be effective in
protecting participants against almost any kind of impersonation.
PIDS would provide immediate relief to millions of Americans who
have been the victims of identity theft and are still struggling with the
effects. In contrast to the long, determined struggle against identity
thieves that Solove advocates, PIDS also has the potential to
eradicate identity theft quickly and inexpensively.

54. See LoPucki, supra note 6, at 123-24 (discussing scalability of PIDS).

